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Abstract 
We assess the extent to which historical levels of inequality affect the likelihood of 
businesses being created, surviving and of these creating jobs overtime. To this end, 
we build a pseudo-panel of entrepreneurs across 48 countries using the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor Survey over 2001-2009. We complement this pseudo-panel 
with historical data of income distribution and indicators of current business 
regulation. We find that in countries with higher levels of inequality in the 1700s and 
1800s, businesses today are more likely to die young and create fewer jobs. Our 
evidence supports economic theories that argue initial wealth distribution influences 
countries’ development path, having therefore important policy implications for 
wealth redistribution. 
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Introduction 
To foster development it is crucial to understand the reasons why entrepreneurship 
struggles or flourishes. Whilst the economics literature has developed complex theoretical 
models on what might drive entrepreneurship over time, many of these theories have not 
been empirically tested (Naudé, 2010). Instead, the empirical literature has focused on 
analyzing separately the individual, economic or institutional factors that might affect 
entrepreneurship. 
We contribute to the literature by testing empirically one of the main mechanisms 
highlighted in the theoretical literature that suggests initial wealth distribution can affect 
entrepreneurship over time. The theoretical occupational choice model proposed by 
Banerjee and Newman (1993) guides our work. This model suggests that initial conditions, 
understood as the historical distribution of wealth, can be detrimental for economic 
development if credit constraints are such that they prevent poor individuals from 
investing in profitable entrepreneurial activities. The model shows that a country can 
converge to a different family of equilibria, depending on the initial wealth distribution. 
Countries that start with a high proportion of non-credit constrained people will grow over 
time. They will do so aided by a high share of people being able to start-up business and 
these surviving over time along with an active labor market paying high salaries. A 
contrasting equilibrium could be reached if a country starts with a high proportion of credit 
constrained people. In this case, only a small share of the population will be able to start-
up new businesses, whilst the rest will remain as workers, earning low salaries over time, 
in which there is (almost) only self-employment at small scale. 
Based on this model, the main goal of this paper is to test whether initial 
conditions, proxied by the income distribution prevailing in the 1700s and 1800s, and 
taking into account the current business environment, have a detrimental effect on today’s 
chances of businesses being created, surviving, and creating jobs over time. 
Since our interest is to look at the impact of initial conditions on the dynamics of 
entrepreneurship, ideally we would want to follow firms over time. Unfortunately, 
empirically it is difficult to follow the same firms, especially if firms die in large numbers 
creating substantial attrition bias and if surveys are being censored by not representing 
newly created firms. We overcome these limitations by constructing a pseudo-panel of 
entrepreneurs using the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) survey, the largest 
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comparable dataset covering 70 countries over 2001-2009.1 The GEM datasets are drawn 
from a new sample in each country every year. The surveys include nationally 
representative information on how many people claimed to be entrepreneurs of nascent, 
young or established firms. The survey also captures firm’s size at each of these different 
stages of entrepreneurship and whether people have shut down businesses over the last 
year.2 Thus, using this information we build a pseudo-panel of cohorts of people based on 
their age and gender for each country following the methodology proposed by Deaton 
(1985). In doing so, we are able to track generations of people over time and assess 
whether initial conditions and current business environment affect the creation, survival of 
firms, as well as job creation. 
We complement the GEM surveys with historical data of income distribution from 
the 1700s and 1800s estimated by Morrisson and Murtin (2011) and Bourguignon and 
Morrisson (2002) respectively. We also use historical indicators of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) per capita prevailing in the 1800s, obtained from the historical databases 
estimated by Maddison. In addition, we use the index of credit protection provided by the 
World Bank, which measures the degree to which laws protect the rights of borrowers and 
lenders. Thus, this index reflects the extent to which laws are designed to expand access to 
credit. 
We combine the pseudo-panel methodology with instrumental variables. We do so 
given that the index of law protection of borrowers and lenders could be endogenously 
determined by the proportion of people involved in entrepreneurial activities, who for 
instance may lobby for better laws. As instrumental variables we use the legal code of 
origin and the colonial origin, both variables frequently used in the literature when dealing 
with the endogeneity of business regulation (La Porta, 1998; 1999). In addition, we use the 
average blood pressure and cholesterol as instruments, which have been found in the 
literature to be correlated with the physiology responses to economic stress, such as credit 
constraints (Ezzati et al., 2005; O’Neil et al., 2005). 
We find that initial conditions have a detrimental effect on development, even 
when taking into account current regulation in the credit market. Countries that started 
                                                           
1
 Although the survey covers 70 countries we include in our analysis only 48 for which we could obtain data 
on historical income distribution. 
2
 Nascent firms are those recently created that have not paid wages for more than three months; young firms 
have been running for up to 3.5 years and established firms have been running for more than 3.5 years. 
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with a high ratio of rich to poor people during the 1700s or 1800s are currently less likely 
to open new firms, and of these to survive and create more jobs over time. 
Although several articles have tested whether inequality has a detrimental effect on 
development, our central contribution to the literature relies on testing an overlooked 
mechanism as to why this might be the case (Banerjee and Duflo, 2000; Benabou, 1996). 
Specifically, our results suggest that high levels of inequality prevent people from taking 
up business thereby affecting job creation and development in the long-run. 
Our findings also suggest that improvements in the regulation of the current credit 
market promote the creation of both businesses and jobs. This effect, however, is of lower 
magnitude in Africa than in other regions, perhaps because some African households lack 
the property rights of their land, which prevents them from providing a collateral and 
accessing credit. 
The article proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature on 
entrepreneurship, including the model by Banerjee and Newman. Section 3 describes the 
dataset and the construction of the pseudo-panel. Section 4 presents the econometric 
results. Section 5 presents robustness tests. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Initial Conditions and Entrepreneurship 
This article is related to the large literature analyzing the factors that foster or constrain the 
success of entrepreneurs. According to Naudé (2008, 2010) the literature on 
entrepreneurship has experienced three important developments over the last decades, 
which we describe below. 
First, while the traditional research in entrepreneurship has focused on empirically 
assessing the entrepreneurs themselves, there has been a shift from analyzing their 
personality traits and individual characteristics towards their behavior and cognitive issues 
that enable them to recognize and exploit opportunities (Blanchflower et al., 2001; 
Blanchflower and Oswald, 1998; Caliendo and Kritikos, 2011; Shane and Venkartarman, 
2000). The same has happened in economics where there has been a shift towards 
developing theoretical models of occupational choice (Evans and Jovanovic, 1989; Lucas, 
1978). 
The second development in the literature has been to examine how the business 
environment influences the creation of firms and its relationship with long-run 
development (Throton, 1999). Within this literature one can distinguish two veins. The 
first one analyzes the extent to which historical institutions affect current ones, which in 
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turn influence today’s entrepreneurial sector and growth. These studies, for instance, 
examine the development path of former colonies.3 The second vein studies the impact of 
current business regulation (such as investor protection and regulation of entry) on 
entrepreneurship (Djankov et al., 2002; Glaeser et al., 2004; La Porta et al., 1998). Within 
this vein, there is no consensus on whether business regulation always favors 
entrepreneurship. For instance, business regulation could impose a burden on firms if the 
regulation is aimed at extracting rents for the benefit of bureaucrats or certain industries. 
However, the public interest theory of regulation argues entrepreneurship can be fostered 
if regulation reduces market failures, by for instance allowing lenders to seize the 
collateral in case borrowers default (Ardagna and Lusardi, 2008). 
The third development in the literature has been the theoretical analysis of the 
relationship between initial conditions, specifically wealth distribution, and development 
in the long-run. This literature, within the neoclassical viewpoint, analyzes whether initial 
conditions, such as a country’s past inequality, can affect entrepreneurship and economic 
growth in the long-run (Galor, 2011; Murphy et al., 1989a). 4 There is no consensus on the 
extent that initial conditions can affect development. On the one hand, the supporters of 
the “big push” hypothesis, argue that if there is the possibility of coordination of 
investment across various sectors in the economy, which can be promoted with public 
policy, countries can get out of no-industrialization/development traps (Murphy et al., 
1989a; Rosenstain-Rodan, 1943). On the other hand, other articles argue that initial 
conditions can determine the development path. For instance, inequality can have a long-
term detrimental effect on growth if the wealthier individuals lobby against changes in 
policies or institutions that could distribute wealth and foster a more inclusive growth.5 
Inequality can also have a detrimental effect on entrepreneurship if a large proportion of 
individuals are prevented from taking up profitable investments, thus perpetuating 
inequality and low levels of economic growth in the long-run. This negative effect of 
inequality on long-run development could be exacerbated whenever accompanied by 
credit market imperfections (Aghion and Bolton, 1997; Banerjee and Newman, 1993; 
Galor and Zeira, 1993; Ghatak and Jiang, 2002). 
                                                           
3
 For instance, Acemoglu et al. (2001) show that settler colonies perform better than former extractive 
colonies because they inherited institutions that better protect private property rights. 
4
 See Benabou (1996) and Galor (2011) for a complete literature review on the effect of inequality on 
development. 
5
 For an extensive overview of the dynamic interaction between political institutions and the development 
process see Acemoglu et al. (2005).  
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Within the third development in the literature, there are few empirical papers, often 
for a single country, testing the impact of wealth distribution on entrepreneurship. These 
studies have found supporting evidence in the USA that wealthier individuals are more 
likely to become entrepreneurs (Hurst and Lusardi, 2004). There is however, mixed 
evidence on whether inequality affects entrepreneurship, or the other way around. For 
instance, Mesnard and Ravallion (2001) show for the case of Tunisia the number of 
business start-ups is an increasing function of aggregate wealth and the greater the initial 
inequality of wealth, the lower the overall rate of new business start-ups.6 In contrast, 
Yanya (2012) concludes that firm establishment causes income inequality, but not the 
other way around using a panel data of the 76 provinces in Thailand over 1997-2008.7 
In this article we follow the theoretical model by Banerjee and Newman (1993) as 
it captures the three main developments in the literature described above: analyzing why 
people choose to become entrepreneurs, and how business institutions along with initial 
wealth distribution can affect entrepreneurship and development in the long-run. 
 
2.1 Banerjee and Newman’s Occupational Choice Model 
Banerjee and Newman’s model assumes that because of imperfections in the credit 
market, people can borrow only limited amounts. These imperfections are derived from 
the possibility that borrowers may renege on their debt. To prevent this, lenders will limit 
borrowing and will require a collateral, such that: 






+<
r
F
wL pi                                            (1) 
where L is the amount borrowed, w is the borrower’s wealth,  pi  is the probability of the 
borrowers being caught if they renege on their debt, F is the nonmonetary punishment of 
being caught, and r represents the return from an indivisible asset requiring no labor.  The 
model assumes that anyone that invests only in this safe asset is said to be idle or 
subsisting. 
To become an entrepreneur people need to make an up-front investment. Thus, 
entrepreneurship is only available to those individuals that are wealthy enough to make 
this investment or provide the required collateral to access credit. Those poorer individuals 
                                                           
6
 Initial wealth is measured by the amount of wealth accumulated by returned migrants from past savings 
while abroad. 
7
 Income inequality is measured using the Gini coefficient. The causal relationship between firm creation and 
inequality is assessed using the granger causality test. 
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that do not have enough wealth to provide collateral have two occupation choices: they 
can become employees, and those individuals with wealth between w* and w** can also 
become self-employed. Self-employment is assumed to require some up-front investment 
but of lower level than that required to become an entrepreneur. As entrepreneurship 
requires an up-front investment, it is available only to wealthy people or those who can 
provide the required collateral, whereas poorer individuals who are credit constrained are 
limited to becoming employees or if they have wealth between w* and w**  they could 
choose to become self-employed. 
The expected return to self-employment and subsistence are given exogenously by 
the model’s parameters. Wage, v, is determined endogenously in the model such that it 
clears the labor market, and in turns determines the returns of entrepreneurs and workers. 
The equilibrium wage can take a low value  if , a high 
value   if  and a value within the range   if 
. Gt(w*) is the proportion of the population that has no other choice 
but to become a worker, as it does not have enough wealth to provide collateral to become 
entrepreneurs. µ[1- Gt(w*)] is the proportion of the population that can become 
entrepreneurs. Thus, people’s occupational choice depends on their initial wealth as 
follows: 
1) individuals with initial wealth less than w* will choose to become workers unless 
wages are exactly equal a minimum level . In this case, some potential workers will 
remain idle as there will be no enough jobs for all potential workers. 
2) individuals with initial wealth between  w* and w** can become self-employed 
and will do so if the equilibrium wage for workers is below the returns they can earn as 
self-employed. 
3) individuals with  will become entrepreneurs if the equilibrium wage is 
below a maximum level under entrepreneurship is profitable . In the case , then 
 of them will opt to become self-employed for the labor market to 
clear. 
 
The pattern of occupational choice is determined by the initial distribution of 
wealth, and the structure of occupational choice determines in turn how much people can 
save and leave as a bequest. These factors in turn lead to a new distribution of wealth 
affecting long-run development. 
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The model predicts the fate of the economy depends on the initial wealth 
distribution. Countries with an initially high proportion of non-credit constrained people 
will grow over time aided by a high share of people being able to start-up businesses that 
survive over time and with an active labor market paying high salaries. A contrasting 
equilibrium could be reached if a country starts with a high proportion of credit 
constrained people. In this case, the process of development ends up in a situation of low 
wages, in which there is (almost) only self-employment at small scale. 
Based on the Banerjee and Newman model, we will test the following two 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Countries that have a historically high ratio of wealthy to poor 
people, a proxy for the ratio of non-credit to credit-constrained, have a lower probability of 
firms being created, surviving and of these creating jobs over time. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Countries that currently have more efficient credit markets have a 
higher probability of people being involved in entrepreneurship and higher job creation. 
 
2.2 Endogeneity between Credit Regulation and Entrepreneurship 
When testing our second hypothesis we are likely to encounter an endogeneity problem. 
We would expect that more efficient credit markets will benefit entrepreneurs. However, it 
is also possible the degree of imperfections in the credit market change in response to the 
number of entrepreneurs in the economy, if for instance there is lobbying for better 
regulation (Besley and Gathak, 2010; Manski, 2000). We address this potential 
endogeneity by using instrumental variables. 
We use four instrumental variables across all the regressions presented in Section 
4. Two of these variables (origin of country’s legal code and colonial origin), are drawn 
from the institutional literature that has used these instruments to deal with the 
endogeneity of the current business environment. The other two instrumental variables 
used (average blood pressure and cholesterol level) are drawn from the recent literature on 
physiological responses to economic stress linked for example to being credit constrained. 
We explain below the literature supporting the use of these instruments. 
Based on the pioneering work of La Porta et al. (1998, 1999) several authors have 
addressed the likely endogeneity of the current business environment using as instrumental 
variables the country’s historical legal origin (Ardagna and Lusardi, 2008; Djankov et al., 
2003; Gleasser et al., 2004; Levine et al., 2000).  La Porta et al. show the legal rules 
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protecting investors are largely dependent on the legal traditions or origins. For instance, 
they find that countries under the English common law are more protective of investor 
rights and contractual enforcements than the laws originating in the French civil code. 
Thus, countries with “better” legal origins are more likely to develop institutions in which 
property rights are protected and less distorting policies are implemented, which in turn 
favor investment and economic growth.8 Other studies have also found the colonial origin 
of the country is a strong predictor of the current institutions (Acemoglu, et al., 2001). 
These authors explain that different types of colonization policies created different sets of 
institutions which persisted over time. At one extreme, whenever colonizers aimed at 
exclusively draining resources from the colony, they developed “extractive” institutions 
with poor emphasis on protecting private investment.9 In contrast, whenever colonizers 
intended to settle in these colonies in the long-run, they tried to replicate European 
institutions, protecting property rights.10 
According to recent literature, people who find it hard to gain access to credit can 
experience physiological responses to stress. For instance, people experiencing financial 
distress are less likely to follow recommended health maintenance practices such as eating 
a healthy diet, thus elevating the risk of cardiovascular diseases, high blood pressure and 
cholesterol (O’Neill et al., 2005). Also, cardiovascular diseases, high blood pressure and 
cholesterol have been predicted to rise with economic development and hence to vary 
across regions, an important aspect since the credit market regulation we analyze varies 
sharply across countries (Ezzati et al., 2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
8
 La Porta et al. (1998) argue that countries under the English common law have the best investor right 
protection and contractual enforcements, followed by those under German or Scandinavian civil law, and of 
these followed by countries with French civil law. 
9
 Belgian colonization in the Congo is an example of extractive institutions, whilst the British colonization of 
Australia, New Zealand, United States and Canada are examples of pro-European institutions (Acemoglu et 
al., 2001).  
10
 Acemoglu et al. (2001) argues that former British colonies prospered relative to former French, Spanish, 
and Portuguese colonies because of the good economic and political institutions and culture they inherited 
from Britain. 
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3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Historical Statistics and Current Credit Regulation 
In our regression models presented in Section 4 we control for countries’ initial wealth per 
capita. For this purpose, we use the GDP per capita prevailing in the 1800s estimated by 
Angus Maddison’s historic income database.11 
We also use the historical data on income distribution prevailing in the 1700s and 
1800s as estimated by Morrisson and Murtin12 (2011) and Bourguignon and Morrisson 
(2002) respectively. These estimates provide the income share for each decile, which we 
use to build different indicators to proxy the historical ratio of people that were credit and 
non-credit constrained, such as the Gini coefficient and different ratios of income shares 
across different deciles. We do so as Banerjee and Newman stress that income inequality 
is the main factor preventing poor people to invest in entrepreneurial activities. Moreover, 
previous research has shown that people in the lower deciles are less likely to have access 
to credit, as they might not have enough wealth to provide a collateral or are living far 
from a banking institution, thus affecting their chances of obtaining credit (Baliamoune-
Lutz et al., 2011; Berg, 2013). 
Since we are interested in assessing the impact that credit market imperfections 
have on the creation of firms and jobs over time, we use indicators of credit protection 
from the Doing Business database gathered by the World Bank from 2004 to 2009.13 
Specifically, we use the strength of the legal right index, which “measures the degree to 
which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the right of borrowers and lenders and thus 
facilitate lending.” The index ranks from 0 to 10. Higher scores indicate that collateral and 
bankruptcy laws are better designed to expand access to credit.14  This variable is 
particularly suitable for our analysis as it is a proxy for the extent to which better credit 
rules can enhance investment incentives by improving collateralizability of assets and 
                                                           
11
 Online data available at: Maddison Project website http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-
project/home.htm 
12
 We thank Fabrice Murtin for having provided us these datasets. 
13
 Since the Doing Business dataset covers the period 2004-2009, we imputed the values for the period 2001-
2003 taking the information for the year 2004 or for the closest year for which we had information. We did 
so to retain as much information as possible for earlier years and given that there is little change in the 
business environment observed over the years we have.  
14
 Data on the legal rights of borrowers and lenders are gathered through a questionnaire administered to 
financial lawyers and verified through analysis of laws and regulations as well as public sources of 
information on collateral and bankruptcy laws. A detailed description of this index can be found in: 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/methodology/getting-credit  
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limiting the unfair seizure of collateral. All these aspects improve property rights and 
thereby reduce imperfections in the credit market (Besley and Gathak, 2010). 
 
3.2 GEM Survey 
We use the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) survey, the largest study of 
entrepreneurial activity over 2001-2009.15 The surveys are representative of the adult 
population and are collected annually. In developing countries the survey is conducted in 
face-to-face interviews, and elsewhere through random telephone interviews. 
We use the definition of “entrepreneurs” proposed by the GEM network: “adults in 
the process of setting up a business they will (partly) own and or currently owning and 
managing and operating young businesses” (Reynolds et al., 2005 p. 209). To study the 
dynamics of entrepreneurship we consider the four stages in the life-cycle of businesses, as 
defined by the GEM network. In the first stage, nascent entrepreneurs, are those actively 
involved in setting up a business they will own or co-own, but who have not paid salaries, 
wages or any other payments to the owners for more than three months. In the second 
stage are the owners of young firms, defined as those who have paid salaries for more than 
three months and up to 3.5 years. In the third stage, established firms, are those who have 
paid salaries or wages for more than 3.5 years. In the fourth and last stage are firms that in 
the past 12 months, have been sold, shut down or discontinued. 
For our analysis, we focus on 48 countries surveyed in GEM for which we have 
also gathered historic information on income distribution and GDP per capita. The 
countries analyzed are listed in Table A.1 in the Appendix. In total, we have 1,001,458 
individuals interviewed over 2001-2009. From these, 37,136 were in nascent 
entrepreneurship, 32,359 in young firms, 62,514 in established firms and 25,183 had 
recently shut down their firm. 
In Table A.2, in the Appendix, we report the basic descriptive statistics of the 
pseudo-panel and other aggregate indicators used for the whole sample. Figure 1 shows 
the percentage of the population engaged in the various stages of entrepreneurship 
analyzed over 2001-2009. The onset of the economic crises reduced the percentage of the 
population involved in entrepreneurial activities across all stages (nascent, young and 
established firms) particularly in 2009. 
 
                                                           
15
 The chosen period of analysis corresponds to the period for which the GEM datasets are publicly available. 
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3.3 Pseudo-Panel 
Since GEM draws new samples each year, the surveys remain representative of the 
population engaged (or that were engaged) in entrepreneurial activities over time, avoiding 
an attrition bias. However, we cannot study the decision of the same individuals to become 
or remain in entrepreneurial activities over time. To overcome this limitation, we construct 
a pseudo-panel using the GEM surveys and the methodology proposed by Deaton (1985). 
We describe next the construction of the pseudo-panel. 
GEM consist of a set of T independent cross-sections of i individuals that belong to 
a new and most likely different set of I individuals in each period. Equation (2) denotes the 
factors that affect whether a person is an entrepreneur, if we were to stack together all the 
cross-section observations, typically known in the literature as pooled-cross section. 
 
                                                                  yit=βxit+δi+εit                                                     (2) 
where yit denotes whether the individual is engaged in an entrepreneurial stage, xit denotes 
a vector of explanatory variables, δi and εit denote the individual-specific time-constant 
unobserved heterogeneity; and the unobserved idiosyncratic error that varies over 
individuals and time. 
OLS estimates using these pooled-cross section data will be biased and inconsistent 
if the individual unobserved characteristics (such as personal traits, risk aversion or 
cognitive abilities) were correlated with some or all of the explanatory variables. To solve 
this potential endogeneity problem, Deaton (1985) proposed building a pseudo-panel, 
which yields consistent β estimators, even when the individual unobservable 
characteristics are correlated with explanatory variables. Pseudo-panels have the additional 
advantage of avoiding attrition problems that plague genuine panels, since data are 
collected from random samples drawn from cross sections.16 
To build the pseudo-panel Deaton (1985) proposes to average observations with 
similar characteristics that are stable over time (such as gender, year of birth) in a 
sequence of repeated cross-sectional datasets. These synthetic observations can therefore 
be thought of as cohorts of generations being “followed” over time, just as if pure panel 
surveys were available. 
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 The pseudo-panel approach is particularly useful for life-cycle models, largely used in social mobility 
analysis (Antman and Mckenzie, 2005) and previously used by Gutiérrez-Romero (2012) to study 
entrepreneurship in Spain.   
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Following Gutiérrez-Romero (2012) who built a pseudo-panel using the GEM survey for 
the case of Spain, we build the pseudo-panel by defining the cohorts within countries in 
terms of gender and year of birth, as these are observable and do not change over time.17 
In total, we have nine time periods (2001-2009) and 10 cohorts in each. Five of these 
cohorts are for males, and five for females. Within each gender we further defined five 
cohorts of age: those who in 2001 were 28 years old or less, 29-38, 39-48, 49-58 and over 
58.18 The average sample size for each cohort is shown in Table A.3. 
We produce the pseudo-panel by averaging observations over individuals in each 
of the cohorts C described above and T periods, as shown in equation (3). 
 
                                                            ctctctct xy εδβ ++=                                                (3) 
where the bars denote the average value of all individuals in cohort c at time t. The average 
of the fixed effects of those members belonging to cohort c in the sample ctδ  varies over 
time. Since ctδ   is unobserved it might be correlated with ctx , therefore it could lead to 
inconsistent estimates.19 
Baltagi (2005) explains that pseudo-panels estimations could be biased if cohorts 
do not have enough observations to eliminate a potential unobserved heterogenity bias. 
Verbeek and Nijman (cited by Gutiérrez-Romero, 2012) show that if each cohort has more 
than 100-200 observations, as in our case, then the cohorts will be large enough to 
eliminate the unobserved heterogeneity bias if assumed the individual error is time 
invariant, ctδ = cδ . In that case, equation (3) can be estimated using cohort dummy 
variables yielding unbiased estimators. 
To ensure the estimators are efficient, we control for the likely problem of 
heteroskedasticity, which could occur if the number of observations per cohort varies 
substantially. To correct for this we use weighted least squares (WLS) by weighting by the 
square root of the number of observations in each cohort, as is recommended in the 
literature (Dargay, 2007). 
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 We also define cohorts following age and gender as the literature has found evidence that the probability of 
engaging in entrepreneurial activities differs considerably with regard to these two variables (Bergmann and 
Sternberg, 2007). 
18
 For instance, individuals are considered to belong to the first cohort of age if they were aged 30 in year 
2001, 31 in 2002, 32 in 2003 and so on.  
19
 This is likely in our case because we consider a number of explanatory variables that might be correlated 
with the error term, such as individuals’ personality traits like risk aversion and cognitive abilities. Since 
these characteristics are unobservable and might be correlated with our outcome of interest, the estimated 
effect could be biased. 
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4. Econometric Results 
 
4.1 Impact of Initial Conditions on Firm’s Life Cycle: Birth, Maturity and Death 
To test our two hypotheses and to deal with the potential endogeneity of the degree of 
credit protection we extend equation (3) and estimate instead equation (4). We correct for 
this endogeneity in a two-stage process, as is standard in the literature, so equation (4) 
represents the IV-second-stage least squares estimation. 
                        ctctctct XxLindexINEQZyE εδββββα ++++++= 43218201]|[             (4) 
where  measures the dependent variable in the second-stage least square, as the 
proportion of individuals involved in a specific stage of entrepreneurship, namely nascent, 
young, established or recently closed firm. INEQ1820 represents the historical ratio of 
wealthy people (income share of top 9th decile) to poor people (bottom 1st decile) 
prevailing in 1820. We use this indicator as a proxy of the ratio of non-credit to credit 
constrained people. Lindex represents the strength of legal right index20,  X is a set of 
characteristics, which includes GDP per capita in 1800, regional and year dummy variables 
to control for unobserved regional and time effects. At cohort level, in  we include the 
proportion of people in cohort c at time t with secondary education or more, and control for 
cohort fixed effects ctδ . Z is the instrument used in the first-stage least squares, which is a 
dummy variable for whether the country’s legal origin code is English or not. All variables 
are measured in logarithms except the generation cohort, the instrumental variable Z , 
regional and time dummy variables. 
Table A.4, in Appendix, shows the results of the first-stage regressions. This table 
includes the coefficients associated with our instrument, whether the origin of the legal 
code is English, and our endogenous variable, the legal right index. We find the instrument 
is positive and statistically significant across all models presented. We also include the 
summary statistics for the first stage regressions, in which the F-statistics test of the 
excluded instrument, is greater than 10 and statistically significant across all models ran, 
which suggest our instrument is not weak. 
Table 1 presents the results of the IV-second-stage least squares. There we also 
include the endogeneity test, which confirms the legal right index is endogenous with our 
                                                           
20
 Note the legal right index ranks from 0 to 10, however this index is not equal to 0 for any of the countries 
over the time period considered in the analysis, which then enables us to apply a log transformation.  
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dependent variable , the proportion of people involved in different entrepreneurial 
stages. The Kleibergen-Paap Wald F statistic test confirms the instrument is correlated 
with the endogenous variable, the legal right index. 
Our results confirm the first hypothesis. The higher the ratio of wealthy to poor 
people in 1820 the lower the probability that people were engaged in entrepreneurial 
activities across all stages, nascent, young and established firms during the period 2001-
2009 (Table 1, columns 1-4). The lower the income share of the poor relative to the 
wealthy, the lower the share of people involved in firms of any type. For instance, a 1% 
increase in the historic ratio of wealthy to poor reduces the proportion of people involved 
in nascent firms by 0.2%, the proportion of people involved in young firms by 0.17% and 
the proportion of people involved in established firms by 0.08%. 
We also find evidence to support our second hypothesis. The higher the index of 
legal rights, a proxy we use for efficiency in the credit market, the higher the proportion of 
people involved in entrepreneurial activities. Specifically a 1% increase in the legal right 
index, increases the proportion of people involved in nascent firms by almost 1%, the 
proportion of people involved in young firms by 0.8%, and the proportion of people 
involved in established firms by 0.22%. These results suggest the strength of the legal 
right index is more important in the early stages of entrepreneurship than those already 
established. There are potential reasons for this. For instance, already established firms 
might have had time to generate their own financial resources (from previous profits) and 
had enough time to develop networks other than with financial markets, which could 
enable them to stay afloat in case of requiring prompt credit. This argument is in line with 
previous research that shows small and medium firms are more likely to be more credit 
constrained than larger firms (Claessens et al., 2007). For instance, Kuntchev et al. (2013) 
show the firms’ perception of being credit constrained is negatively correlated with firm’s 
size and age: smaller and younger firms tend to find access to credit to be a more stringent 
constraint to carry out their operations than larger and older firms. 
We also find the higher the historical GDP per capita is, the fewer the people who 
would be involved in different stages of entrepreneurial activity over time. It is unclear 
why this might be the case. One potential reason, and in line with the predictions of 
Banerjee and Newman model, is that countries that started with higher historical GDP per 
capita over time developed a more active labor market, paying higher wages. As wages 
rise more people would prefer becoming workers, instead of entrepreneurs. 
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The cohort effects on entrepreneurial activity show that in general, older 
individuals are more prone to be involved in established businesses, while younger people 
are engaged in young firms. This result is consistent with previous studies that show that 
because knowledge, capital accumulation, and experience increase with age, over time 
individuals are more likely to have an established firm (Bergmann and Sternberg, 2007). 
In addition, we find evidence the higher the proportion of people with high school 
education or more, the lower is the likelihood of engaging in entrepreneurial activities, 
across nascent, young and established firms during the period 2001-2009. A number of 
studies have found a positive correlation between education and degree of 
entrepreneurship, suggesting that education helps people identify business opportunities 
(Simón-Moya et al., 2014). Our findings instead, support the other vein in the literature 
that has found that general education to be negatively related to the probability of being 
self-employed (Blanchflower, 2004; Reynolds et al., 2003). These studies argue that 
general education is not necessarily correlated with being an entrepreneur as specific 
entrepreneurial knowledge is what matters more, such as knowledge in accounting and 
finance (Man et al., 2002). Other empirical studies have found that employees in Spain 
and Portugal value more having higher level of educations, whilst self-employed people 
have lower levels of education (Garcia-Mainar and Montuenga-Gomez, 2005). 
To conclude this sub-section, we focus on the regional differences on firm’s life 
cycle. We find that Africa was less likely to create firms and of these to survive over time 
than firms located in the rest of the world over 2001-2009. These results might reflect the 
structural and institutional differences supporting entrepreneurship in Africa and the rest 
of the world. 
 
4.2 Impact of Initial Conditions on Job Creation: Firms’ Size 
We next move on to analyze the extent to which initial conditions and credit markets 
affect the number of employees hired by firms, as shown in equation (5). 
 
ctctctct regionLindexXxLindexINEQZsE εδβββββα +++++++= *]|[ 543218201     (5) 
where cts  represents the average number of employees hired by firms in each stage of 
entrepreneurship in the cohort c at time t. In addition, we interact the legal right index with 
a regional variable (Lindex*region) to take into account regional differences in the credit 
regulation. We also add in  a categorical variable denoting the sector of the firm and a 
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dummy variable denoting whether the firm has a medium/high level of technological 
intensity, both variables provided in the GEM surveys. We measure in logarithm our 
dependent variable, the ratio of wealthy to poor, GDP per capita in 1800 and the legal right 
index.21 
We chose these explanatory variables following the literature on the determinants 
of firms’ size. Our key explanatory variable affecting firm size over time is the historical 
ratio of wealthy to poor. We include this variable based on the theoretical model of 
Banerjee and Newman, expecting the higher the historical income inequality the smaller 
the firms will be. We also include in our regressions the legal right index, as the literature 
predicts that countries with better institutions and more access to credit are more likely to 
develop larger firms (Beck et al., 2003; 2005). In addition, we control for sector fixed 
effects and technological intensity as the literature has found these variables to play a 
crucial role in firm’s size (Aghion et al., 2007). Finally, we take into account market size, 
as the literature predicts that firms will expand in size the larger the expected market 
profits are (Lucas, 1978). Since we are interested in studying the impact of initial 
conditions, and to avoid a potential endogenity issue with current market size, we use as a 
proxy of market size the GDP per capita prevailing in 1800 and not actual GDP per capita. 
The legal right index is likely to be endogenous with the size of the firms, as well 
as the interaction of this legal right index with the seven regional dummies used.22 Thus, 
we require at least eight instruments, one for our proxy for access to credit, and seven for 
this variable interacted with the dummy regional variables. The instruments Z we use are: 
the origin of the country’s legal code (one dummy for each legal code: English common 
law, French commercial code, Socialist/Communist law, German commercial code and 
Scandinavian commercial code); the colonial origin of the country (a dummy variable 
equal to one if the country’s colonial origin is Spanish, and zero otherwise) and two 
variables that measure blood pressure and cholesterol at country level23. 
                                                           
21
 Given that firms could have no workers hired, our dependent variable could take the value of zero. In this 
case we would lose observations if the logarithm of that variable was taken. To prevent the loss of 
observations we transformed our dependent variable by adding one to the number of hired workers. We then 
took the logarithm of that transformed variable.  
22
 The regions considered in the analysis are: Africa, Asia, Western Europe, Latin America, North America, 
Oceania and Eastern Europe. 
23
 We obtained the data on blood pressure and cholesterol from the School of Public Health, Imperial College 
London.http://www1.imperial.ac.uk/publichealth/departments/ebs/projects/eresh/majidezzati/healthmetrics/m
etabolicriskfactors/ 
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Tables A.5.1 to A.5.3, in the Appendix, show the first stage regressions. This table 
includes the coefficients associated with our instruments and our endogenous variables, 
the legal right index and its interaction with the regional variables. We find the 
instruments are statistically significant across all models presented. The F-statistics test of 
the excluded instruments are greater than 10 and statistically significant across all models 
ran, which suggest our instruments are not weak. 
In Table 2 we present the IV second-stage least squares. There we also include the 
endogeneity test, which shows our dependent variables are endogenous. As before, we 
include the Kleibergen-Paap rank Wald F statistic test which confirms that our instruments 
are not weak. All models are just identified. 
We find mixed evidence to support our first hypothesis. On the one hand, the 
higher the historical ratio of wealthy to poor, the bigger the nascent firms were over 2001-
2009 (Table 2, column 1). On the other hand, and in line with our first hypothesis, the 
higher the historical ratio, the smaller the young and established firms are over time (Table 
2, columns 2-3). This evidence suggests that as the income share of the poor shrinks (the 
higher the historical ratio of wealthy to poor) the bigger the nascent firms aided perhaps by 
low salaries. But, once firms get older they shrink in size. This apparent mixed evidence is 
however consistent with the predictions of Banerjee and Newman (1993). Their model 
predicts that countries with a high ratio of rich to poor will fail in the long-run in building 
a real demand for the local market production, thus affecting the size of firms as they 
mature. Similarly, Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989b) show that countries with high 
income inequality will have low demand for labor as they do not have critical mass in their 
markets to justify firms of bigger size. 
We find evidence to support our second hypothesis. The higher the legal right 
index the bigger the firm’s size, across all stages of entrepreneurship.24 The effect of this 
index is greater for the nascent firms, and decreases for young and established firms. This 
confirms, as shown earlier, that once firms are already established they might be less 
dependent on external credit sources than firms that have just started. 
Our estimates suggest improving credit protection increases the firm’s size to a 
lesser extent in Africa compared to other regions. This suggests that even if regulation is 
improved in Africa, its effect will be lower than in other regions, perhaps because fewer 
                                                           
24
 We obtain the total effect of this legal index by adding up the coefficients of the legal right index and the 
interactions between this variable and the regional dummies, which are statistically significant across all 
specifications in Table 2. 
  
19 
people in Africa will take advantage of the improved institutions if they do not have the 
required collateral. Thus, policy interventions aimed at reducing barriers to credit should 
take into account the specificities of the different regions. In some regions the problem 
could be the lack of resources or competition in the banking system and the lack of 
protection of lenders; while in others it could be the excess of collateral requirements. For 
instance, Baliamoune-Lutz et al. (2011) point out that a major issue for African countries 
is the collateral needed to secure bank loans. Some households in these countries do not 
have formal titles for their lands, and the constraint is particularly severe for women-
headed households. 
 
5. Robustness Checks 
We conducted three main robustness checks to assess the validity and consistency of the 
results presented so far. 
First, we re-run our IV-pseudo-panel regressions but excluding from the analysis 
self-employed people, in other words, people who claimed not to have hired workers. We 
do so as the model by Banerjee and Newman (1993) distinguishes between self-employed 
and entrepreneurship. Table A.6 tests our two hypotheses on the probability of people 
being engaged in entrepreneurial activities, and Table A.7 on the size of the firms. Both 
tables confirm our previous results that inequality is detrimental to the creation of 
businesses, their survival and to creating jobs overtime, whilst a better legal right index is 
beneficial. 
Second, we test alternative inequality measures using the historical income 
distribution of 1820. Specifically we use four different ratios of wealthy to poor and other 
indicators such as the Gini index, finding no differences versus the results presented so 
far.25 Tables A.8 and A.9 in the Appendix show that overall, the detrimental effect of 
income inequality on firm’s life cycle and job creation is robust across the alternative 
indices used. 
                                                           
25
 These four ratios are defined as: The income share of the 1st decile to the average income (bottom 10); 
income share of the 9th decile to average income (top 90); income share of the median to the average income 
(middle50); the income share of the 8th decile to the income share of the bottom 2nd decile 
(top20/bottom20). We also use the sum of the income shares of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th quintiles (middle). 
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Across all regressions presented in Table 1 and Table 2 we also tested the ratio of 
wealthy to poor but for 1700. This ratio yields practically identical results to the ones 
presented using the ratio 1820s, hence we chose to omit these results but are available 
upon request. 
Third, we consider different instrumental variables in our estimations, such as 
religion and language fractionalization (Alesina et al., 2002), which are commonly used in 
the literature. However, as Tables A.10 to A.13 show all of these variables proved to be 
weaker instruments than the ones presented in our estimations. Overall, since these are 
weak instruments we obtain less consistent estimations compared to our preferred 
estimations shown earlier, using stronger instruments. 
 
6. Conclusion 
The aim of this article was to test the theoretical predictions that initial conditions of 
income inequality along with the current business environment affect the probability of 
creating new businesses and of these surviving over time and creating jobs. For this 
purpose, we built a pseudo-panel of cohorts of people across 48 countries over 2001-2008, 
using the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor Survey and the pseudo-panel methodology 
proposed by Deaton (1985). 
We draw two main conclusions from our results. First, initial inequality, 
understood as the inequality prevailing in the 1700s or 1800s, has a persistent and 
detrimental effect on the creation and survival of firms as well as job creation over time. 
Second, in countries with worse credit markets, proxied in our analysis by an index that 
measures the accessibility to credit, it is less likely that firms will be created, survive and 
create jobs over time. 
Our findings are consistent with the prediction of the model by Banerjee and 
Newman (1993). This model suggests that if the initial wealth distribution is such that a 
large percentage of the population is credit constrained, then fewer firms will be created 
and survive over time especially in the presence of credit market imperfections. 
Despite the extensive research on the relationship between inequality and 
economic growth, considerable disagreement about the sign of this relationship in the 
literature still remains. Banerjee and Duflo (2000) argue previous studies are far from 
being conclusive about this relationship, because of identification problems and data 
limitations in cross-country studies. Moreover, most empirical articles have assessed the 
impact of inequality by using relatively recent indicators of inequality, (not historic ones 
  
21 
as in this paper), limiting our understanding of the extent to which early inequality 
conditions affect economic development over time. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first empirical article that tests the 
predictions of Banerjee and Newman model and other similar theoretical models that 
suggest initial conditions, understood as the wealth distribution prevailing in the distant 
past, can affect entrepreneurship and development in the long-run. Our results have 
important policy implications. Although we did not specifically test for convergence, our 
findings suggest that some countries are predisposed by their initial conditions to be 
trapped into a firms-die-young equilibrium, whilst others are in a different type of 
equilibrium with businesses thriving over time. Thus, economic convergence across 
countries is unlikely to occur. Our findings, in line with the theoretical literature, suggest 
that to foster the creation of businesses and jobs, policies should focus on addressing long-
standing differences in wealth within countries as well as reducing credit constraints. 
Incidentally, these policies could foster convergence across countries as well, an issue that 
deserves further research. 
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Fig. 1. Proportion of people engaged in entreprenerual stages. 
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Table 1  
IV second stage pseudo-panel regression: Impact on firm’s life cycle. 
Initial conditions
Log (Ratio 90/10) -0.197*** (0.005) -0.175*** (0.005) -0.087*** (0.004) -0.177*** (0.011)
Log (GDPpc1800) -0.749*** (0.006) -0.698*** (0.006) -0.500*** (0.006) -0.683*** (0.009)
Institutional environment
Log (IndexCreditProtection) 0.997*** (0.011) 0.799*** (0.011) 0.222*** (0.010) 0.707*** (0.011)
Region (reference group: Africa)
Asia 0.206*** (0.010) 1.073*** (0.011) 1.625*** (0.010) 0.727*** (0.019)
Western Europe 0.209*** (0.010) 0.664*** (0.011) 1.325*** (0.010) -0.004 (0.011)
Latin America 1.445*** (0.011) 1.541*** (0.012) 1.476*** (0.011) 1.310*** (0.012)
North America 0.892*** (0.010) 1.029*** (0.011) 1.443*** (0.010) 0.475*** (0.015)
Oceania 0.122*** (0.009) 0.570*** (0.010) 1.384*** (0.009) -0.203*** (0.010)
Eastern Europe 0.297*** (0.010) 0.433*** (0.011) 0.880*** (0.010) -0.018 (0.012)
Individual characteristics
% of individuals with high school or more (at 
cohort level) -0.142*** (0.006) -0.345*** (0.006) -0.317*** (0.005) -0.121*** (0.026)
Cohort (Male aged 16-28 reference group)
Male 29-38 0.138*** (0.004) 0.182*** (0.004) 1.143*** (0.004) 0.308*** (0.004)
Male 39-48 -0.105*** (0.004) -0.136*** (0.004) 1.355*** (0.004) 0.273*** (0.004)
Male 49-58 -0.570*** (0.005) -0.515*** (0.005) 1.237*** (0.004) 0.247*** (0.005)
Male 59-64 -1.456*** (0.006) -1.420*** (0.006) 0.453*** (0.005) 0.074** (0.037)
Female 16-28 -0.609*** (0.004) -0.593*** (0.004) -0.637*** (0.004) -0.384*** (0.004)
Female 29-38 -0.464*** (0.004) -0.347*** (0.004) 0.369*** (0.004) -0.117*** (0.004)
Female 39-48 -0.686*** (0.004) -0.687*** (0.004) 0.594*** (0.004) -0.186*** (0.004)
Female 49-58 -1.172*** (0.005) -1.172*** (0.004) 0.367*** (0.004) -0.375*** (0.006)
Female 59-64 -2.200*** (0.009) -2.136*** (0.009) -0.333*** (0.005) -0.553*** (0.013)
Year (reference: 2001)
2002 -0.178*** (0.005) -0.054*** (0.005) 0.105*** (0.005) -0.346*** (0.015)
2003 0.023*** (0.005) 0.171*** (0.006) 0.257*** (0.005) -0.106*** (0.020)
2004 -0.333*** (0.006) -0.072*** (0.005) 0.248*** (0.005) -0.223*** (0.018)
2005 -0.134*** (0.005) 0.004 (0.005) 0.349*** (0.005) -0.308*** (0.019)
2006 -0.064*** (0.005) 0.147*** (0.005) 0.417*** (0.005) -0.217*** (0.035)
2007 -0.114*** (0.005) 0.091*** (0.005) 0.435*** (0.005) -0.238*** (0.023)
2008 -0.116*** (0.005) 0.166*** (0.005) 0.687*** (0.005) -0.103*** (0.021)
2009 1.142*** (0.007) 1.418*** (0.007) 1.102*** (0.005)
Constant 0.772*** (0.027) 0.085*** (0.028) -1.636*** (0.026) 0.259*** (0.066)
No. Observations 959,199 942,535 973,873 914,094
R-squared 0.509 0.506 0.603 0.469
F test 31198.78*** 31095.09*** 30728.22*** 27843.20***
K-P Wald rk  F statistic (weak identification test) 150,000*** 130,000*** 140,000*** 150,000***
Endogeneity test 5520*** 3866.9*** 150.286*** 2591.045***
(4)
Closed
IV
(1)
Nascent
IV
(2)
Young
IV
(3)
Established
IV
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 2  
IV second stage pseudo-panel regression: Impact on job creation. 
Initial conditions
Log (Ratio 90/10) 0.605*** (0.126) -0.304*** (0.066) -0.165*** (0.024)
Log (GDPpc1800) -0.792***(0.127) 0.093 (0.060) 0.087*** (0.022)
Institutional environment
Log(IndexCreditProtection) Total effect  7.023***(0.703) 1.996*** (0.283)  2.224*** (0.218)
Ommited: Log(IndexCreditProtection)*Africa
Log(IndexCreditProtection) 0.529*** (0.162) 0.508*** (0.079) 0.332*** (0.051)
Log(IndexCreditProtection)*Asia 2.028*** (0.216) 0.514*** (0.090) 0.344*** (0.049)
Log(IndexCreditProtection)*Western Europe 1.354*** (0.147) 0.113* (0.058) 0.352*** (0.045)
Log(IndexCreditProtection)*Latin America 1.941*** (0.196) 0.505*** (0.066) 0.436*** (0.044)
Log(IndexCreditProtection)*North America -0.390 (0.284) 0.060 (0.085) 0.181*** (0.055)
Log(IndexCreditProtection)*Oceania 0.280** (0.136) -0.313*** (0.078) 0.118** (0.047)
Log(IndexCreditProtection)*Eastern Europe 1.282*** (0.148) 0.609*** (0.058) 0.461*** (0.044)
Individual characteristics
% of individuals with high school or more           
(at cohort level) -0.669***(0.117) -0.114** (0.051) 0.066*** (0.023)
Male 29-38 -0.119* (0.063) -0.073** (0.030) 0.024 (0.020)
Male 39-48 0.118 (0.079) 0.013 (0.037) 0.066*** (0.019)
Male 49-58 -0.584***(0.122) -0.204*** (0.047) -0.043* (0.023)
Male 59-64 0.018 (0.164) -0.171* (0.091) -0.270*** (0.030)
Female 16-28 -0.548***(0.099) -0.393*** (0.034) -0.339*** (0.025)
Female 29-38 -0.802***(0.079) -0.308*** (0.029) -0.369*** (0.021)
Female 39-48 -0.676***(0.072) -0.601*** (0.039) -0.337*** (0.022)
Female 49-58 0.328 (0.212) -0.359*** (0.103) -0.472*** (0.025)
Female 59-64 -0.510* (0.310) -0.620*** (0.093) -0.577*** (0.031)
Technology sector (reference: No/ Low technology sector)
Medium or high -0.003 (0.068) 0.069* (0.036) 0.025 (0.020)
Sector (reference: Extractive sector)
Transforming sector 0.095 (0.088) 0.057 (0.039) 0.064*** (0.015)
Business services 0.146 (0.092) 0.024 (0.041) 0.099*** (0.016)
Consumer oriented 0.041 (0.088) 0.030 (0.039) 0.014 (0.014)
Year (reference: 2001)
2002 -0.378 (0.245) -0.258*** (0.098) 0.146*** (0.025)
2003 0.831*** (0.270) 0.038 (0.094) 0.314*** (0.028)
2004 0.479** (0.243) -0.363*** (0.093) 0.084*** (0.023)
2005 0.465* (0.255) -0.147 (0.094) 0.188*** (0.024)
2006 0.063 (0.273) -0.316*** (0.093) 0.170*** (0.024)
2007 0.009 (0.220) -0.157* (0.093) 0.141*** (0.025)
2008 -0.615** (0.241) -0.277*** (0.095) 0.132*** (0.025)
2009 0.436*** (0.029)
Constant 2.758*** (1.046) 0.660 (0.514) 0.168 (0.169)
No. Observations 6,952 22,119 53,067
F test 933.11*** 1833.33*** 3332.82***
K-P Wald rk F statistic (weak identification test)  27.24***  106.994***  317.925***
Endogeneity test 28.58***  62.53*** 489.05***
Cohort (Male aged 16-28 reference group)
Nascent 
IV
Young
IV
Established
IV
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1 
Historical indicators in countries analyzed. 
Country GDP per capita 1800
Ratio90/10 
1820 Freq. Percent Region
Argentina 871.63 6.00 18,070 1.80 Latin America
Australia 671.48 7.75 12,646 1.26 Oceania
Austria 1434.51 5.42 4,199 0.42 Western Europe
Bosnia and Herzegovina 490.82 12.00 4,016 0.40 Eastern Europe
Brazil 509.20 9.38 20,000 2.00 Latin America
Canada 1159.50 7.75 7,008 0.70 North America
Chile 702.10 6.00 19,005 1.90 Latin America
China 985.89 5.22 14,443 1.44 Asia
Colombia 522.98 9.38 8,157 0.81 Latin America
Croatia 1227.06 12.00 16,013 1.60 Eastern Europe
Czech Republic 1622.74 5.42 2,001 0.20 Eastern Europe
Denmark 1342.84 6.19 26,083 2.60 Western Europe
Egypt 748.79 5.50 2,603 0.26 Africa
Finland 1037.69 6.19 18,044 1.80 Western Europe
France 1388.32 6.11 17,947 1.79 Western Europe
Germany 1695.68 5.42 58,535 5.84 Western Europe
Greece 934.41 12.00 13,970 1.39 Western Europe
Hungary 1390.67 5.42 17,726 1.77 Eastern Europe
Iceland 801.90 6.19 16,025 1.60 Western Europe
India 562.88 4.80 10,751 1.07 Asia
Indonesia 514.12 4.30 2,000 0.20 Asia
Ireland 1213.17 10.00 15,888 1.59 Western Europe
Italy 1339.84 6.11 20,744 2.07 Western Europe
Japan 1055.06 6.75 17,270 1.72 Asia
Korea 596.01 5.22 8,023 0.80 Asia
Macedonia 800.76 12.00 1,971 0.20 Eastern Europe
Mexico 1053.60 9.38 9,448 0.94 Latin America
Netherlands 2412.43 5.92 29,625 2.96 Western Europe
New Zealand 541.62 7.75 8,868 0.89 Oceania
Norway 950.00 6.19 19,921 1.99 Western Europe
Peru 697.30 9.38 9,985 1.00 Latin America
Philippines 626.97 6.47 2,000 0.20 Asia
Poland 1198.39 12.00 6,001 0.60 Eastern Europe
Portugal 1284.41 6.11 5,023 0.50 Western Europe
Romania 12.00 6,218 0.62 Eastern Europe
Russia 823.99 12.00 9,378 0.94 Eastern Europe
Serbia 1308.87 12.00 6,776 0.68 Eastern Europe
Slovenia 1357.95 12.00 21,138 2.11 Eastern Europe
South Africa 759.05 10.83 24,865 2.48 Africa
Spain 1443.02 6.11 158,307 15.81 Western Europe
Sweden 1100.00 6.19 38,786 3.87 Western Europe
Switzerland 1612.48 5.92 13,632 1.36 Western Europe
Taiwan 871.27 5.22 2,236 0.22 Asia
Thailand 496.98 6.47 7,043 0.70 Asia
Turkey 869.92 9.58 7,217 0.72 Asia
UK 2716.87 10.00 197,518 19.72 Western Europe
United States 1912.62 6.84 36,848 3.68 North America
Venezuela 442.02 9.38 7,487 0.75 Latin America
Total 1,001,458 100
 
   Sources: GDP per capita Madisson's database, ratio 90/10 Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002). 
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Table A.2  
Summary of main variables. 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
% of people involved in
Nascent firms 4.32 3.68 4.22 3.15 3.58 3.65 3.72 4.21 3.37
Young firms 2.75 2.97 3.17 2.77 3.21 3.53 3.58 3.63 3.09
Established firms 4.57 5.54 5.75 5.50 6.64 5.98 6.33 7.92 7.05
Closed firms 2.83 2.99 2.32 2.73 2.50 2.61 3.14 2.63
% of people 
Education high school or more 63.26 59.94 72.91 55.87 56.93 66.82 64.75 69.13 71.65
Firm's size by entrepreneurial stage
Nascent firms 2 7 3 4 3 4 11 11
Young firms 8 6 5 7 6 6 5 7
Established firms 8 13 15 9 11 9 10 10 10
Sector of activity
Extractive sector 9.15 7.98 8.99 9.93 6.24 8.75 7.23 8.56 9.97
Transforming sector 29.19 28.80 27.36 30.48 26.86 31.74 28.83 28.16 24.12
Business services 21.23 22.00 22.74 21.24 21.42 17.24 21.57 19.07 15.19
Consumer oriented 40.42 41.23 40.91 38.35 45.49 42.26 42.37 44.20 50.71
Medium/high technology intensity 7.78 7.09 7.09 7.07 7.06 4.91 5.61 5.12 3.10
Observations 62,598 115,418 92,228 140,537 110,870 171,465 153,657 133,793 156,825
 
 
 
 
Table A.3  
Number of observations per cohort. 
 
Cohort Freq. Percent
<29male 118,663 11.85
>28male 87,396 8.73
>38male 82,135 8.2
>48male 70,088 7.0
>58male 107,228 10.71
<29female 121,738 12.16
>28female 106,129 10.6
>38female 98,491 9.83
>48female 82,431 8.23
>58female 127,159 12.7
Total 1,001,458 100
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Table A.4  
IV first stage pseudo-panel regression: Impact on firm’s life cycle. 
Initial conditions
Log (Ratio 90/10) -0.229*** (0.002) -0.224*** (0.002) -0.221*** (0.002) -0.239*** (0.002)
Log (GDPpc1800) 0.284*** (0.001) 0.294*** (0.001) 0.291*** (0.001) 0.284*** (0.002)
Region (reference group: Africa)
Asia -0.240*** (0.005) -0.249*** (0.005) -0.232*** (0.005) -0.244*** (0.006)
Western Europe -0.136*** (0.005) -0.146*** (0.005) -0.145*** (0.005) -0.111*** (0.005)
Latin America -0.392*** (0.005) -0.401*** (0.005) -0.389*** (0.005) -0.378*** (0.005)
North America -0.325*** (0.005) -0.332*** (0.005) -0.325*** (0.005) -0.300*** (0.006)
Oceania 0.155*** (0.004) 0.158*** (0.004) 0.163*** (0.004) 0.171*** (0.004)
Eastern Europe -0.031*** (0.005) -0.046*** (0.005) -0.035*** (0.005) -0.011** (0.005)
Year (reference: 2001)
2002 -0.013*** (0.002) -0.021*** (0.002) -0.012*** (0.002) -0.006* (0.003)
2003 -0.105*** (0.002) -0.119*** (0.002) -0.106*** (0.002) -0.092*** (0.004)
2004 -0.059*** (0.002) -0.053*** (0.002) -0.046*** (0.002) -0.046*** (0.004)
2005 -0.056*** (0.002) -0.057*** (0.002) -0.045*** (0.002) -0.040*** (0.004)
2006 -0.055*** (0.002) -0.056*** (0.002) -0.045*** (0.002) -0.050*** (0.007)
2007 -0.057*** (0.002) -0.069*** (0.002) -0.043*** (0.002) -0.036*** (0.005)
2008 0.036*** (0.002) 0.024*** (0.002) 0.052*** (0.002) 0.063*** (0.004)
2009 -0.036*** (0.002) -0.039*** (0.003) -0.033*** (0.003) 0.469*** (0.001)
Individual characteristics
% of individuals with high school or 
more (at cohort level) 0.143*** (0.002) 0.159*** (0.002) 0.156*** (0.002) 0.135*** (0.005)
Cohort (Male aged 16-28 reference group)
Male 29-38 0.003 (0.002) 0.003 (0.002) 0.006*** (0.002) 0.003* (0.002)
Male 39-48 0.017*** (0.002) 0.020*** (0.002) 0.016*** (0.002) 0.015*** (0.002)
Male 49-58 0.031*** (0.002) 0.040*** (0.002) 0.033*** (0.002) 0.030*** (0.002)
Male 59-64 0.058*** (0.002) 0.059*** (0.002) 0.064*** (0.002) 0.036*** (0.007)
Female 16-28 0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 0.004*** (0.002)
Female 29-38 0.002 (0.002) 0.004** (0.002) 0.006*** (0.002) 0.001 (0.002)
Female 39-48 0.020*** (0.002) 0.024*** (0.002) 0.017*** (0.002) 0.016*** (0.002)
Female 49-58 0.034*** (0.002) 0.045*** (0.002) 0.037*** (0.002) 0.038*** (0.002)
Female 59-64 0.068*** (0.002) 0.063*** (0.002) 0.077*** (0.002) 0.048*** (0.003)
Legal origin (reference: other legal origin)
English 0.458*** (0.001) 0.448*** (0.001) 0.454*** (0.001) 0.469*** (0.001)
Constant 0.229*** (0.010) 0.153*** (0.010) 0.143*** (0.010) 0.213*** (0.015)
No. Observations 959,199 942,535 973,873 914,094
 R-squared 0.526 0.535 0.518 0.536
Shea Partial R2 0.1458   0.1404 0.1441  0.1507   
Partial R2 0.1458   0.1404   0.1441  0.1507   
F statistic test excluded instruments 150,000*** 130,000*** 140,000*** 150,000***
Log (Index
CreditProtection)
Log (Index
CreditProtection)
Log (Index
CreditProtection)
Log (Index
CreditProtection)
Nascent firms Young firms Established firms Closed firms
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table A.5.1  
IV first stage pseudo-panel regression: Impact on job creation in nascent firms. 
Initial conditions
Log (Ratio 90/10) -0.114*** (0.022) -0.619*** (0.024) 0.206*** (0.027) -0.101*** (0.016) -0.192*** (0.017) 0.062*** (0.021) 0.339*** (0.027)
Log (GDPpc1800) 0.107*** (0.012) -0.059*** (0.018) 1.102*** (0.017) 0.005 (0.006) 0.260*** (0.018) -1.191*** (0.026) -0.126*** (0.015)
% of individuals 
with high school or 0.176*** (0.020) 0.123*** (0.023) -0.409*** (0.025) 0.180*** (0.020) 0.094*** (0.014) -0.074*** (0.024) 0.138*** (0.019)
Male 29-38 0.017 (0.011) 0.098*** (0.016) 0.100*** (0.017) -0.011 (0.007) -0.082*** (0.013) -0.036** (0.017) -0.036*** (0.014)
Male 39-48 -0.004 (0.011) 0.085*** (0.018) 0.093*** (0.020) -0.043*** (0.009) -0.050*** (0.014) -0.025 (0.015) 0.013 (0.020)
Male 49-58 0.045** (0.018) 0.072*** (0.023) 0.101*** (0.022) 0.044*** (0.011) -0.083*** (0.014) 0.035 (0.025) -0.051*** (0.017)
Male 59-64 0.027 (0.026) 0.037 (0.029) 0.054 (0.039) -0.001 (0.013) -0.014 (0.016) -0.021 (0.027) 0.057** (0.028)
Female 16-28 0.018 (0.017) -0.025 (0.017) 0.192*** (0.023) 0.082*** (0.010) -0.087*** (0.013) -0.004 (0.018) -0.120*** (0.025)
Female 29-38 0.007 (0.012) 0.146*** (0.018) 0.178*** (0.019) 0.032*** (0.006) -0.100*** (0.019) -0.107*** (0.022) -0.062*** (0.016)
Female 39-48 0.043*** (0.011) 0.040** (0.020) 0.032 (0.020) 0.050*** (0.011) -0.051*** (0.013) 0.039* (0.021) 0.037** (0.018)
Female 49-58 -0.067*** (0.022) 0.003 (0.040) -0.034 (0.045) -0.029*** (0.011) 0.174*** (0.052) -0.087 (0.053) -0.026 (0.022)
Female 59-64 0.018 (0.028) 0.166*** (0.047) 0.189*** (0.059) -0.047** (0.021) -0.151*** (0.022) 0.049* (0.029) -0.113*** (0.033)
Medium or high -0.028** (0.014) -0.002 (0.016) -0.002 (0.019) -0.011 (0.010) 0.016 (0.015) -0.012 (0.017) -0.011 (0.017)
Transforming sector -0.033** (0.015) -0.059*** (0.022) 0.008 (0.024) -0.010 (0.011) -0.018 (0.016) -0.042* (0.024) 0.066*** (0.019)
Business services -0.021 (0.015) -0.031 (0.022) 0.014 (0.025) -0.014 (0.011) -0.025 (0.017) -0.008 (0.024) 0.030 (0.020)
Consumer oriented -0.028** (0.014) -0.028 (0.021) 0.016 (0.023) -0.009 (0.010) -0.021 (0.015) -0.044** (0.022) 0.043** (0.018)
2002 -0.042 (0.028) -0.214*** (0.036) -0.505*** (0.043) -0.011 (0.015) 0.132*** (0.020) -0.264*** (0.032) 0.568*** (0.032)
2003 -0.198*** (0.029) -0.248*** (0.035) -0.326*** (0.044) -0.179*** (0.021) 0.193*** (0.023) -0.142*** (0.031) 0.404*** (0.032)
2004 0.002 (0.027) -0.262*** (0.037) -0.425*** (0.045) -0.035** (0.016) 0.087*** (0.018) -0.060** (0.027) 0.503*** (0.032)
2005 0.001 (0.027) -0.357*** (0.035) -0.312*** (0.043) -0.039*** (0.015) 0.137*** (0.020) -0.194*** (0.031) 0.484*** (0.031)
2006 -0.000 (0.027) -0.220*** (0.038) -0.434*** (0.050) -0.053*** (0.016) 0.147*** (0.021) -0.161*** (0.031) 0.572*** (0.038)
2007 -0.004 (0.028) -0.104*** (0.033) -0.218*** (0.042) 0.029* (0.015) 0.076*** (0.018) -0.119*** (0.030) 0.386*** (0.035)
2008 0.311*** (0.030) -0.235*** (0.036) -0.085* (0.044) 0.206*** (0.020) 0.203*** (0.022) -0.240*** (0.029) 0.511*** (0.037)
French -0.673*** (0.012) -0.030 (0.020) 0.302*** (0.021) 0.009 (0.010) -0.247*** (0.018) -0.515*** (0.022) 0.078*** (0.015)
 Socialist/Communist -0.322*** (0.023) -0.009 (0.024) -0.955*** (0.025) 0.010 (0.008) -0.139*** (0.015) -0.004 (0.023) 1.311*** (0.032)
 German -0.267*** (0.016) 0.422*** (0.036) 0.412*** (0.031) -0.043*** (0.010) -0.213*** (0.017) -0.644*** (0.022) -0.100*** (0.019)
 Scandinavian -0.569*** (0.012) -0.103*** (0.020) 0.731*** (0.021) -0.021** (0.009) -0.137*** (0.013) -0.760*** (0.021) -0.094*** (0.015)
Spain -0.041*** (0.011) -0.663*** (0.015) -0.684*** (0.017) 1.351*** (0.013) 0.138*** (0.012) -0.150*** (0.012) 0.030**
Blood pressure -0.017*** (0.002) -0.051*** (0.003) 0.057*** (0.003) -0.016*** (0.001) -0.038*** (0.002) -0.055*** (0.002) 0.027*** (0.001)
Colestherol 0.425*** (0.030) -1.094*** (0.036) 0.315*** (0.029) 0.178*** (0.017) -0.015 (0.014) 1.743*** (0.036) 0.321*** (0.025)
Constant 1.568*** (0.171) 14.398*** (0.266) -15.835*** (0.289) 1.253*** (0.115) 3.710*** (0.251) 7.206*** (0.313) -5.585*** (0.203)
No. Observations 6,952 6,952 6,952 6,952 6,952 6,952 6,952
R-squared 0.722 0.799  0.893 0.914 0.301 0.646 0.772
Partial R2 of 
excluded  0.63 0.7021 0.7708 0.8788 0.2216 0.5490  0.7344
Shea R2   0.1942   0.1268  0.2161  0.1522   0.1107 0.2703 0.2599 
F statistic test 
excluded 1117.91*** 1474.49*** 1931.21*** 7744.93*** 35.89*** 262.46*** 361.21***
Colonial  origin (reference: other colonial origins or never colonized by a western oversea)
Legal origin (reference: English)
Year (reference: 2001)
Sector (reference: Extractive sector)
Individual characteristics
Technology sector (reference: No/ Low technology sector)
Eastern Europe*
Log (IndexCredit
Protection)
Oceania*
Log (IndexCredit
Protection)
North America*
Log (IndexCredit
Protection)
Latin America*
Log (IndexCredit
Protection)
Western Europe*
Log (IndexCredit
Protection)
Asia*
Log (IndexCredit
Protection)
Log (IndexCredit
Protection)
Cohort (Male aged 16-28 reference group)
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table A.5.2 
IV first stage pseudo-panel regression: Impact on job creation in young firms 
Initial conditions
Log (Ratio 90/10) -0.028** (0.012) -0.559*** (0.014) 0.119*** (0.019) 0.172*** (0.010) 0.038*** (0.010) -0.215***(0.011) 0.398*** (0.017)
Log (GDPpc1800) 0.193*** (0.008) -0.211*** (0.011) 0.956*** (0.012) -0.139*** (0.005) 0.329*** (0.012) -0.677***(0.020) -0.208*** (0.007)
Individual characteristics
% of individuals with high 
school or more (at cohort 
level)
0.145*** (0.012) 0.065*** (0.015) -0.337*** (0.017) -0.009 (0.012) 0.201*** (0.013) -0.015 (0.017) 0.163*** (0.012)
Cohort (Male aged 16-28 reference group)
Male 29-38 0.012 (0.008) 0.001 (0.011) -0.002 (0.013) 0.002 (0.007) -0.006 (0.010) 0.012 (0.012) 0.001 (0.009)
Male 39-48 0.017* (0.009) -0.039*** (0.013) 0.002 (0.014) 0.010 (0.008) 0.014 (0.013) 0.019 (0.015) 0.005 (0.011)
Male 49-58 0.042*** (0.011) -0.049*** (0.017) 0.040** (0.020) -0.020** (0.009) -0.005 (0.016) 0.061*** (0.018) -0.002 (0.014)
Male 59-64 0.037 (0.031) -0.089*** (0.022) -0.122*** (0.037) 0.026 (0.026) 0.120*** (0.040) 0.064 (0.045) 0.085*** (0.030)
Female 16-28 -0.001 (0.009) -0.026* (0.014) -0.008 (0.016) 0.012 (0.008) 0.015 (0.014) 0.012 (0.018) -0.005 (0.010)
Female 29-38 0.023*** (0.008) -0.037*** (0.011) 0.030** (0.014) 0.026*** (0.008) 0.007 (0.012) 0.022 (0.014) -0.029*** (0.011)
Female 39-48 0.042*** (0.032) -0.028** (0.023) -0.021 (0.042) 0.025** (0.036) 0.029* (0.038) 0.040** (0.045) 0.009 (0.030)
Female 49-58 0.033 (0.028) -0.056*** (0.020) -0.080*** (0.027) -0.035** (0.016) 0.079*** (0.021) 0.024 (0.019) 0.044 (0.028)
Female 59-64 0.041 (0.032) -0.143*** (0.024) -0.108*** (0.041) 0.044 (0.035) 0.178*** (0.041) 0.063 (0.044) 0.064** (0.030)
Technology sector (reference: No/ Low technology sector)
Medium or high -0.017* (0.010) 0.019 (0.013) 0.041** (0.017) -0.010 (0.009) -0.019 (0.015) 0.002 (0.016) -0.042*** (0.012)
Sector (reference: Extractive sector)
Transforming sector -0.030*** (0.011) 0.001 (0.013) -0.007 (0.016) 0.040*** (0.008) -0.007 (0.013) -0.044***(0.016) -0.032** (0.013)
Business services -0.030*** (0.011) -0.009 (0.014) -0.066*** (0.017) 0.013* (0.008) 0.036** (0.015) -0.005 (0.018) -0.020 (0.013)
Consumer oriented -0.043*** (0.011) 0.049*** (0.013) 0.011 (0.016) 0.024*** (0.008) -0.016 (0.012) -0.086***(0.016) -0.037*** (0.012)
Year (reference: 2001)
2002 -0.104*** (0.032) -0.110*** (0.024) -0.378*** (0.039) 0.022 (0.028) 0.251*** (0.045) 0.057 (0.046) 0.069** (0.030)
2003 -0.197*** (0.032) -0.072*** (0.024) -0.139*** (0.040) -0.131*** (0.035) 0.130*** (0.042) 0.118*** (0.045) -0.018 (0.029)
2004 -0.054* (0.032) -0.101*** (0.023) -0.309*** (0.039) 0.027 (0.028) 0.086** (0.039) 0.151*** (0.045) 0.124*** (0.029)
2005 -0.090*** (0.032) -0.136*** (0.024) -0.092** (0.039) -0.054* (0.029) 0.089** (0.040) 0.084* (0.045) 0.051* (0.029)
2006 0.012 (0.031) 0.018 (0.023) -0.181*** (0.039) -0.031 (0.029) 0.103** (0.041) -0.009 (0.044) 0.190*** (0.031)
2007 -0.050 (0.032) 0.081*** (0.024) -0.010 (0.039) 0.009 (0.030) -0.042 (0.041) -0.053 (0.045) 0.073** (0.030)
2008 0.094*** (0.033) -0.210*** (0.023) -0.125*** (0.039) 0.004 (0.029) 0.153*** (0.040) 0.017 (0.043) 0.245*** (0.032)
Legal origin (reference: English)
French -0.584*** (0.008) -0.234*** (0.012) 0.367*** (0.013) 0.205*** (0.006) -0.342*** (0.011) -0.417***(0.015) 0.071*** (0.007)
Socialist/Communist -0.297*** (0.016) 0.090*** (0.014) -0.689*** (0.020) 0.057*** (0.007) -0.253*** (0.012) -0.160***(0.011) 1.236*** (0.018)
German -0.196*** (0.010) 0.356*** (0.022) 0.409*** (0.020) 0.068*** (0.006) -0.389*** (0.014) -0.577***(0.018) 0.090*** (0.010)
Scandinavian -0.316*** (0.010) -0.099*** (0.013) 1.005*** (0.016) -0.008 (0.006) -0.214*** (0.011) -0.848***(0.025) -0.139*** (0.010)
Colonial  origin (reference: other colonial origins or never colonized by a western oversea)
Spain -0.028*** (0.008) -0.425*** (0.008) -0.541*** (0.010) 1.059*** (0.012) 0.122*** (0.007) -0.099***(0.006) 0.004 (0.006)
Blood pressure -0.012*** (0.001) -0.049*** (0.001) 0.058*** (0.002) -0.009*** (0.001) -0.060*** (0.002) -0.011***(0.001) 0.020*** (0.001)
Colestherol 0.436*** (0.019) -0.702*** (0.019) 0.500*** (0.019) 0.184*** (0.012) -0.060*** (0.012) 0.873*** (0.026) 0.477*** (0.015)
Constant 0.089 (0.104) 13.001***(0.160) -15.860*** (0.189) 0.761*** (0.078) 5.837*** (0.172) 2.515*** (0.177) -4.628*** (0.127)
No. Observations 22,119 22,119 22,119 22,119 22,119 22,119 22,119
R2 0.654 0.675 0.828 0.700 0.417 0.447 0.776
Partial R2 of excluded instruments0.4664 0.5409 0.6715 0.6359 0.3438 0.3585 0.7125
Shea R2 0.1596 0.1368 0.2216 0.2294 0.1577 0.1835 0.3205
F statistic test excluded 
instruments 1654.21*** 2501.37*** 4193.59*** 6516.38*** 240.8*** 193.72*** 1118.16***
Eastern Europe*
Log (IndexCredit
Protection)
Oceania*
Log (IndexCredit
Protection)
North America*
Log (IndexCredit
Protection)
Log (IndexCredit
Protection)
Asia*
Log (IndexCredit
Protection)
Western Europe*
Log (IndexCredit
Protection)
Latin America*
Log (IndexCredit
Protection)
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table A.5.3  
IV first stage pseudo-panel regression: Impact on job creation in established firms. 
Initial conditions
Log (Ratio 90/10) -0.030*** (0.007) -0.487*** (0.010) 0.096*** (0.012) 0.140*** (0.006) 0.045*** (0.007) -0.161*** (0.007) 0.287*** (0.011)
Log (GDPpc1800) 0.184*** (0.005) -0.165*** (0.007) 0.940*** (0.009) -0.121*** (0.004) 0.305*** (0.008) -0.697*** (0.012) -0.193*** (0.006)
Individual characteristics
% of individuals with high school or 
more (at cohort level) 0.105*** (0.008) 0.094*** (0.010) -0.414*** (0.011) -0.058*** (0.007) 0.254*** (0.009) -0.078*** (0.011) 0.217*** (0.008)
Cohort (Male aged 16-28 reference group)
Male 29-38 0.009 (0.007) -0.010 (0.010) 0.003 (0.012) 0.004 (0.006) 0.005 (0.010) 0.014 (0.010) -0.009 (0.008)
Male 39-48 0.016** (0.007) 0.001 (0.010) -0.021* (0.012) 0.007 (0.006) 0.017* (0.010) 0.009 (0.010) 0.008 (0.008)
Male 49-58 0.025*** (0.007) 0.007 (0.011) -0.053*** (0.012) -0.009 (0.006) 0.028*** (0.010) 0.013 (0.010) 0.030*** (0.008)
Male 59-64 0.017* (0.010) 0.026* (0.016) -0.155*** (0.017) -0.020** (0.008) 0.055*** (0.014) 0.059*** (0.015) 0.067*** (0.010)
Female 16-28 0.009 (0.009) -0.013 (0.013) 0.017 (0.017) 0.009 (0.008) 0.016 (0.013) 0.017 (0.015) -0.021* (0.012)
Female 29-38 0.006 (0.008) -0.026** (0.011) 0.014 (0.013) 0.006 (0.007) 0.016 (0.011) 0.020* (0.011) -0.013 (0.009)
Female 39-48 0.013 (0.008) -0.030*** (0.010) -0.025* (0.013) -0.005 (0.007) 0.058*** (0.011) 0.023** (0.011) -0.004 (0.009)
Female 49-58 0.015 (0.011) -0.023* (0.012) -0.063*** (0.015) -0.010 (0.008) 0.068*** (0.012) 0.021* (0.012) 0.013 (0.013)
Female 59-64 0.026** (0.011) 0.011 (0.017) -0.186*** (0.019) -0.018* (0.009) 0.083*** (0.015) 0.096*** (0.016) 0.048*** (0.011)
Technology sector (reference: No/ Low technology sector)
Medium or high -0.018** (0.007) -0.007 (0.012) 0.046*** (0.013) -0.021*** (0.006) -0.016 (0.011) -0.005 (0.011) -0.003 (0.009)
Sector (reference: Extractive sector)
Transforming sector -0.045*** (0.005) 0.003 (0.007) -0.063*** (0.009) 0.028*** (0.004) 0.002 (0.007) -0.048*** (0.008) 0.011* (0.006)
Business services -0.052*** (0.006) -0.027*** (0.008) -0.115*** (0.010) 0.015*** (0.004) 0.042*** (0.008) -0.012 (0.009) 0.021*** (0.007)
Consumer oriented -0.059*** (0.005) 0.031*** (0.007) -0.033*** (0.008) 0.006 (0.004) -0.006 (0.007) -0.088*** (0.008) 0.017*** (0.006)
Year (reference: 2001)
2002 -0.070*** (0.008) -0.136*** (0.009) 0.047*** (0.013) -0.004 (0.005) 0.010 (0.015) 0.053*** (0.013) -0.078*** (0.009)
2003 -0.138*** (0.009) -0.107*** (0.010) 0.290*** (0.015) -0.130*** (0.010) -0.106*** (0.014) 0.134*** (0.014) -0.200*** (0.011)
2004 -0.041*** (0.007) -0.126*** (0.009) 0.050*** (0.012) -0.002 (0.006) -0.099*** (0.012) 0.124*** (0.013) -0.011 (0.008)
2005 -0.064*** (0.008) -0.182*** (0.010) 0.296*** (0.013) -0.083*** (0.007) -0.110*** (0.012) 0.086*** (0.013) -0.096*** (0.008)
2006 0.021*** (0.007) -0.027*** (0.010) 0.104*** (0.012) -0.024*** (0.005) -0.091*** (0.013) 0.019 (0.012) 0.038*** (0.010)
2007 -0.012 (0.009) -0.001 (0.011) 0.339*** (0.013) -0.009 (0.007) -0.208*** (0.012) -0.014 (0.012) -0.077*** (0.008)
2008 0.134*** (0.008) -0.238*** (0.011) 0.268*** (0.013) 0.011** (0.006) -0.059*** (0.013) 0.017 (0.010) 0.071*** (0.009)
2009 0.060*** (0.010) -0.171*** (0.014) 0.462*** (0.017) 0.029*** (0.008) -0.120*** (0.015) 0.001 (0.014) -0.148*** (0.010)
Legal origin (reference: English)
French -0.629*** (0.005) -0.210*** (0.009) 0.277*** (0.009) 0.165*** (0.003) -0.329*** (0.008) -0.413*** (0.009) 0.051*** (0.004)
Socialist/Communist -0.298*** (0.011) 0.014 (0.012) -0.859*** (0.014) 0.045*** (0.005) -0.231*** (0.008) -0.166*** (0.008) 1.328*** (0.013)
German -0.194*** (0.006) 0.563*** (0.014) 0.202*** (0.013) 0.053*** (0.003) -0.375*** (0.009) -0.565*** (0.011) 0.050*** (0.006)
Scandinavian -0.283*** (0.005) -0.060*** (0.008) 0.966*** (0.010) 0.006* (0.003) -0.202*** (0.007) -0.798*** (0.014) -0.140*** (0.006)
Colonial  origin (reference: other colonial origins or never colonized by a western oversea)
Spain -0.009 (0.007) -0.477*** (0.006) -0.557*** (0.007) 1.098*** (0.009) 0.096*** (0.005) -0.098*** (0.004) 0.030*** (0.003)
Blood pressure -0.015*** (0.001) -0.048*** (0.001) 0.056*** (0.001) -0.007*** (0.001) -0.052*** (0.001) -0.014*** (0.001) 0.022*** (0.001)
Colestherol 0.417*** (0.013) -0.859*** (0.016) 0.451*** (0.014) 0.157*** (0.008) -0.051*** (0.009) 0.944*** (0.018) 0.403*** (0.012)
Constant 0.650*** (0.071) 13.199*** (0.103) -15.395*** (0.126) 0.725*** (0.057) 5.085*** (0.111) 2.690*** (0.103) -4.236*** (0.099)
No. Observations  53,067  53,067  53,067  53,067  53,067  53,067  53,067
R2 0.645  0.685 0.817  0.713 0.387 0.463 0.815
Partial R2 of excluded instruments  0.5023  0.5688 0.6787  0.6563  0.3249 0.3823 0.7674
Shea R2  0.1616  0.1533 0.1763 0.2154 0.1406  0.1959  0.2178
F statistic test excluded instruments 4580.40*** 4786.64***  11390.30*** 12558.59***  441.32***  511.07***  4015.29***
Oceania*
Log (IndexCredit
Protection)
Eastern Europe*
Log (IndexCredit
Protection)
Log (IndexCredit
Protection)
Asia*
Log (IndexCredit
Protection)
Western Europe*
Log (IndexCredit
Protection)
Latin America*
Log (IndexCredit
Protection)
North America*
Log (IndexCredit
Protection)
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table A.6  
IV second stage pseudo-panel regression: Impact on firm’s life cycle excluding self-
employed. 
Initial conditions
Log (Ratio 90/10) -0.175*** (0.005) -0.151*** (0.005) -0.091*** (0.004) -0.176*** (0.011)
Log (GDPpc1800) -0.747*** (0.006) -0.746*** (0.007) -0.498*** (0.006) -0.681*** (0.009)
Institutional environment
Log (IndexCreditProtection) 1.066*** (0.011) 0.829*** (0.012) 0.224*** (0.011) 0.734*** (0.011)
Region (reference group: Africa)
Asia 0.197*** (0.011) 1.141*** (0.012) 1.616*** (0.010) 0.749*** (0.021)
Western Europe 0.163*** (0.010) 0.722*** (0.011) 1.323*** (0.010) -0.002 (0.011)
Latin America 1.497*** (0.012) 1.623*** (0.012) 1.474*** (0.011) 1.348*** (0.012)
North America 0.859*** (0.010) 0.998*** (0.011) 1.440*** (0.010) 0.429*** (0.016)
Oceania 0.119*** (0.010) 0.537*** (0.010) 1.384*** (0.009) -0.212*** (0.010)
Eastern Europe 0.292*** (0.011) 0.515*** (0.011) 0.879*** (0.010) 0.013 (0.013)
Individual characteristics
% of individuals with high school or 
more (at cohort level) -0.095*** (0.006) -0.319*** (0.006) -0.307*** (0.005) -0.126*** (0.027)
Cohort (Male aged 16-28 reference group)
Male 29-38 0.151*** (0.004) 0.199*** (0.004) 1.142*** (0.004) 0.317*** (0.004)
Male 39-48 -0.082*** (0.004) -0.094*** (0.004) 1.354*** (0.004) 0.288*** (0.004)
Male 49-58 -0.551*** (0.005) -0.477*** (0.005) 1.234*** (0.005) 0.248*** (0.006)
Male 59-64 -1.440*** (0.007) -1.414*** (0.007) 0.451*** (0.005) 0.095** (0.038)
Female 16-28 -0.621*** (0.004) -0.623*** (0.004) -0.637*** (0.004) -0.392*** (0.004)
Female 29-38 -0.477*** (0.004) -0.339*** (0.004) 0.367*** (0.004) -0.122*** (0.004)
Female 39-48 -0.679*** (0.004) -0.682*** (0.004) 0.594*** (0.004) -0.190*** (0.005)
Female 49-58 -1.148*** (0.005) -1.157*** (0.005) 0.368*** (0.005) -0.383*** (0.007)
Female 59-64 -2.181*** (0.009) -2.116*** (0.009) -0.333*** (0.005) -0.551*** (0.013)
Year (reference: 2001)
2002 -0.214*** (0.005) -0.092*** (0.005) 0.106*** (0.005) -0.312*** (0.016)
2003 0.008 (0.006) 0.129*** (0.006) 0.257*** (0.005) -0.085*** (0.021)
2004 -0.466*** (0.006) -0.115*** (0.005) 0.250*** (0.005) -0.212*** (0.018)
2005 -0.157*** (0.005) -0.033*** (0.005) 0.352*** (0.005) -0.290*** (0.019)
2006 -0.112*** (0.005) 0.106*** (0.006) 0.415*** (0.005) -0.211*** (0.036)
2007 -0.112*** (0.005) 0.055*** (0.005) 0.436*** (0.005) -0.215*** (0.023)
2008 -0.123*** (0.005) 0.114*** (0.005) 0.688*** (0.005) -0.095*** (0.022)
2009 1.127*** (0.007) 1.378*** (0.008) 1.106*** (0.005)
Constant 0.571*** (0.029) 0.252*** (0.029) -1.651*** (0.027) 0.152** (0.069)
No. Observations 929,305 913,781 937,281 889,726
R-squared  0.497 0.506 0.594 0.464
F-test 30162.72*** 30154.75*** 29253.65*** 27052.57***
K-P rk F statistic (weak identification 
test) 140,000*** 130,000*** 120,000*** 150,000***
Endogeneity test  5636.82*** 3675.33*** 779.85*** 2451.33***
IV IV IV IV
Nascent Young Established Closed
(1) (2) (3) (4)
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table A.7  
IV second stage pseudo-panel regression: Impact on job creation excluding self-employed. 
Initial conditions
Log (Ratio 90/10) 0.511*** (0.130) -0.532*** (0.072) -0.341*** (0.021)
Log (GDPpc1800) -1.270*** (0.157) 0.076 (0.066) -0.039** (0.019)
Institutional environment
Log(IndexCreditProtection) Total effect 1 6.252*** (0.606) 1.984*** (0.284) 1.883*** (0.143)
Ommited: Log(IndexCreditProtection)*Africa
Log(IndexCreditProtection) 0.158 (0.175) 0.318*** (0.080) 0.314*** (0.039)
Log(IndexCreditProtection)*Asia 1.278*** (0.165) 0.396*** (0.094) 0.127*** (0.033)
Log(IndexCreditProtection)*Western Europe 1.142*** (0.107) 0.163*** (0.059) 0.306*** (0.031)
Log(IndexCreditProtection)*Latin America 1.258*** (0.151) 0.333*** (0.070) 0.192*** (0.027)
Log(IndexCreditProtection)*North America 0.888** (0.430) 0.248*** (0.093) 0.275*** (0.045)
Log(IndexCreditProtection)*Oceania 0.099 (0.125) -0.063 (0.084) 0.198*** (0.032)
Log(IndexCreditProtection)*Eastern Europe 1.430*** (0.164) 0.589*** (0.055) 0.472*** (0.030)
Individual characteristics
% of individuals with high school or more (at cohort level) -0.327** (0.134) -0.109* (0.056) -0.110*** (0.016)
Male 29-38 0.457*** (0.089) 0.024 (0.040) 0.128*** (0.012)
Male 39-48 0.257** (0.125) -0.400*** (0.058) 0.011 (0.016)
Male 49-58 0.178 (0.228) -0.155 (0.101) -0.149*** (0.031)
Male 59-64 -0.280** (0.116) -0.467*** (0.039) -0.301*** (0.016)
Female 16-28 -0.490*** (0.083) -0.270*** (0.032) -0.332*** (0.012)
Female 29-38 -0.614*** (0.080) -0.466*** (0.043) -0.300*** (0.015)
Female 39-48 -0.034 (0.280) -0.654*** (0.056) -0.465*** (0.018)
Female 49-58 -0.028 (0.380) -0.752*** (0.106) -0.450*** (0.031)
Female 59-64
Technology sector (reference: No/ Low technology sector)
Medium or high -0.001 (0.070) 0.053 (0.037) 0.014 (0.014)
Sector (reference: Extractive sector)
Transforming sector 0.055 (0.100) 0.082* (0.045) 0.037*** (0.013)
Business services 0.227** (0.106) 0.071 (0.047) 0.048*** (0.014)
Consumer oriented 0.138 (0.098) 0.041 (0.044) 0.002 (0.012)
Year (reference: 2001)
2002 -0.529* (0.306) -0.358*** (0.109) 0.085*** (0.019)
2003 0.418 (0.326) -0.214** (0.102) 0.292*** (0.020)
2004 0.343 (0.300) -0.605*** (0.102) 0.035** (0.018)
2005 0.067 (0.317) -0.298*** (0.105) 0.128*** (0.018)
2006 -0.175 (0.329) -0.411*** (0.105) 0.260*** (0.018)
2007 -0.250 (0.274) -0.205** (0.104) 0.266*** (0.018)
2008 -0.836*** (0.312) -0.403*** (0.106) 0.121*** (0.018)
2009 0.440*** (0.031)
Constant 7.128*** (1.277) 1.694*** (0.573) 1.841*** (0.155)
No. Observations 5,432 19,691 85,057
R-squared 0.63 0.78 0.89
F test 587.4*** 1581.86*** 5222.46***
K-P Wald rk F statistic (weak identification test) 18.08*** 92.39*** 563.33***
Endogeneity test 24.02*** 44.04*** 420.48***
IV IV IV
Nascent Young Established
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table A.8  
IV second stage pseudo-panel regression: Impact on firm’s life cycle using alternative 
historical inequality indicators. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Nascent Young Established Closed
IV IV IV IV
Initial conditions
Log (Gini) -0.495*** 0.036*** -0.401*** -0.237***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.085)
Log (Top90) -0.678*** -0.941*** -0.385*** -0.870***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.019)
Log (Middle 50) 0.686*** 0.358*** 1.169*** 1.052***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.022) (0.097)
Log (Bottom 10) 0.052*** 0.014*** -0.008*** -0.012
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008)
Log (Top20/Bottom20) -0.083*** -0.018*** -0.061*** -0.033***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008)
Log(Middle) 1.830***   0.699*** 1.746***  1.116***
(0.034) (0.035)   (0.031) (0.153)
No. Observations 959,199 942,535 973,873 914,094
 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Top90 is the income share of the 9th decile relative to the income share of the 1st decile 
Middle 50 is the income share of the 5th decile relative to the mean income 
Bottom 10 is the income share of the 1st decile relative to the mean income 
Top20/Bottom20 is the income share of the 8th decile relative to the 2nd decile 
Middle is the income share of the middle class, defined as the income share of the 2nd to 4th quintiles- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
38 
 
Table A.9  
IV second stage pseudo-panel regression: Impact on job creation using alternative historical 
inequality indicators. 
(1) (2) (3)
Nascent Young Established
IV IV IV
Initial conditions
Log (Gini) -1.385*** -1.402*** -0.989***
(0.322) (0.165) (0.069)
Log (Top90) 3.441*** 0.731*** 0.703***
(0.228) (0.136) (0.042)
Log (Middle 50) -3.288*** 2.688*** 1.956***
(0.601) (0.267) (0.136)
Log (Bottom 10) 0.382*** 0.383*** 0.321***
(0.097) (0.040) (0.017)
Log (Top20/Bottom20) 0.105 -0.310*** -0.211***
(0.082) (0.039) (0.016)
Log(Middle) 2.059***  2.687***  1.955***
 (0.001) (0.267) (0.135)
No. Observations 6,952 22,119 53,067
 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Top90 is the income share of the 9th decile relative to the income share of the 1st decile 
Middle 50 is the income share of the 5th decile relative to the mean income 
Bottom 10 is the income share of the 1st decile relative to the mean income 
Top20/Bottom20 is the income share of the 8th decile relative to the 2nd decile 
Middle is the income share of the middle class, defined as the income share of the 2nd to 4th quintiles 
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Table A.10  
IV second stage pseudo-panel regression: Firm’s life cycle using alternative instrumental 
variables. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Nascent              
IV
Young         
IV
Established 
IV
Closed        
IV
Panel a) IV: Language
Key independent variables
Log (Ratio 90/10) -0.258*** -0.292*** -0.263*** -0.178***
Log (IndexCreditProtection) 2.028***  2.334 *** 2.486*** 0.676***
First stage summary results
K-P Wald rk F statistic (weak identification test) 905.36*** 971.81*** 980.37*** 582.48***
Endogeneity test  1072.696*** 1412.251*** 1965.14*** 15.701***
Shea partial R2 0.0041 0.0045 0.0043 0.0057
Partial R2 0.0041 0.0045 0.0043 0.0057
Panel b) IV: Religion
Key independent variables
Log (Ratio 90/10)  -0.072*** -0.871*** -0.0797*** -0.135***
Log (IndexCreditProtection) 0.684*** 0.871*** 0.164*** 0.0218***
First stage summary results
K-P Wald rk F statistic (weak identification test) 8005.066*** 8019.8*** 7955*** 4872.42***
Endogeneity test  1952.341***   1233.588***  143.8*** 27.58***
Shea partial R2 0.0257 0.0268 0.0254 0.0246
Partial R2 0.0257 0.0268 0.0254 0.0246
 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
 
Table A.11  
IV second stage pseudo-panel regression: Impact on job creation using alternative 
instrumental variables. 
(1) (2) (3)
Nascent            
IV
Young         
IV
Established          
IV
IV Language
Log (Ratio 90/10) -12.07 -11.9 -1.32***
Log (IndexCreditProtection) 1.88 5.92  2.45***
IV Religion
Log (Ratio 90/10) -0.160 -2.13*** -1.25***
Log (IndexCreditProtection) 4.8*** 2.61***  2.43***
 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table A.12  
Summary results of using language as instrumental variable to assess impact on job creation. 
IV- Language
Log 
(IndexCredit
Protection)
Asia*
Log (IndexCredit
Protection)
Western Europe*
Log (IndexCredit
Protection)
Latin America*
Log (IndexCredit
Protection)
North America*
Log (IndexCredit
Protection)
Oceania*
Log (IndexCredit
Protection)
Eastern Europe*
Log (IndexCredit
Protection)
Nascent firms
Shea partial R2 0.0001 0.0027 0.0012 0.0001 0.0005 0.0003 0.0004
Partial R2 0.6535 0.5708 0.7054 0.443 0.2106 0.5451 0.7644
F test excluded instruments 1259.43 782.57 1524.8 581.64 34.86 250.78 411.78
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
K-P Wald rk F statistic (weak 
identification test) 0.013
Endogeneity test 47.05***
Young firms
Shea partial R2 0.0002 0.0009 0.0014 0.0009 0.0633 0.0004 0.0532
Partial R2 0.486 0.4802 0.631 0.3229 0.3374 0.3564 0.7437
F test excluded instruments 1547.47 2268.34 3513.56 907.55 236.86 206.85 1241.32
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
K-P Wald rk F statistic (weak 
identification test) 0.12
Endogeneity test 89.67***
Established firms
Shea partial R2 0.0036 0.0199 0.0265 0.0179 0.0653 0.0092 0.1675
Partial R2 0.515 0.5096 0.6474 0.2788 0.3206 0.3804 0.7856
F test excluded instruments 4321.54 4282.36 8815.39 1401.52 444.34 524.48 4546.76
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
K-P Wald rk F statistic (weak 
identification test) 5.607
Endogeneity test 226.05***
 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table A.13 
Summary results of using religion as instrumental variable to assess impact on job creation. 
Log (Index 
Credit
Protection)
Asia*
Log (Index Credit
Protection)
Western Europe*
Log (Index Credit
Protection)
Latin America*
Log (Index 
Credit
Protection)
North America*
Log (Index 
Credit
Protection)
Oceania*
Log (Index Credit
Protection)
Eastern Europe*
Log (Index Credit
Protection)
Nascent firms
Shea partial R2 0.0226 0.2565 0.5256 0.0806 0.0501 0.0509 0.2264
Partial R2 0.6616 0.6466 0.707 0.3622 0.2272 0.7039 0.7465
F test excluded instruments 1356.44 1634.28 1501.46 402.36 36.8 524.48 386.8
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
K-P Wald rk F statistic (weak 
identification test) 8.39
Endogeneity test 112.553***
Young firms
Shea partial R2 0.0056 0.0488 0.0636 0.0199 0.1554 0.0131 0.2274
Partial R2 0.4981 0.5336 0.6312 0.2493 0.3696 0.4997 0.7233
F test excluded instruments 2032.3 2670.9 3471.06 869.56 264.88 370.33 1047.77
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
K-P Wald rk F statistic (weak 
identification test) 5.88
Endogeneity test 68.16***
Established firms
Shea partial R2 0.0041 0.037 0.0452 0.0116 0.0906 0.0113 0.2621
Partial R2 0.5256 0.5571 0.6396 0.2281 0.3493 0.5185 0.777
F test excluded instruments 4597.68 4558.24 9061.98 1668.55 489.86 932.3 4128.77
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
K-P Wald rk F statistic (weak 
identification test) 7.52
Endogeneity test 189.66***
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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